



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

BY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John S. Rovegno
TITLE: Achieving Unity Of Effort With Nongovernmental Organizations In Peace Support Operations
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

United States military forces are participating in an increasing number of small scale contingency (SSC) operations, many with no end in sight. Since the Gulf War, U.S. forces have conducted more than 50 SSCs requiring over 500 military personnel each, a 300% increase over the ten previous years. This increase in missions occurring simultaneously with declining resources has stretched many military units and specialties near their breaking points.

This paper explores methods for the military to cope with its force structure/mission mismatch. It begins by defining and describing the organizations involved, then identifies past challenges incurred in these operations. After outlining national and international policies, the paper shows how all of these pieces can fit together to achieve unity of effort. After showing examples of successful joint ventures between military and civil organizations, it discusses the road ahead. The paper outlines solutions for more quickly achieving military endstate and reducing the adverse impact of these operations on the military, while improving the effectiveness of the international organizations.

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ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

We find it clearly opposed to our national belief that innocent civilians should ever be subject to forcible relocation or slaughter because of their religious, ethnic, racial, or tribal heritage. Ethnic conflict can also threaten regional stability and may well give rise to potentially serious national security concerns. When this occurs, the intersection of our values and national interests make it imperative that we take action to prevent – and whenever possible stop – outbreaks of mass killing and displacement.

—National Security Strategy 2000

United States military forces are participating in an increasing number of small scale contingency (SSC) operations, many with no end in sight. Since the Gulf War, U.S. forces have conducted more than 50 SSCs requiring over 500 military personnel each, a 300% increase over the ten previous years.¹ This increase in missions, occurring simultaneously with declining resources, has stretched many military units and specialties near their breaking points.

Wherever the military deploys to quell conflict or mitigate humanitarian disaster, they find themselves operating side by side with civilian International Organizations (IO). IOs can be further subdivided into Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO). These organizations share the same desire to relieve suffering and bring stability back to troubled regions. The parallel objectives suggest the possibility of working more closely together for mutual benefit.

This paper explores methods for the military to cope with its force structure/mission mismatch. It begins by defining and describing the organizations involved, then identifies past challenges incurred in these operations. After outlining guidance from both national and international agencies, the paper shows how all of these pieces can fit together to achieve unity of effort. It shows examples of successful joint ventures between military and civil organizations, then discusses the road ahead. The paper outlines solutions for more quickly achieving military endstate and reducing the adverse impact of these operations on the military, while simultaneously improving the effectiveness of IOs in general and NGOs in particular, and ensuring success in small scale contingency operations.

Small Scale Contingency (SSC) Operations is a new term that replaces Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war. JP 1-02

THE OPERATIONS

The first challenge in working together is establishing a common language and understanding of the methods used by all players in approaching problems. This section defines some of the terms contained within U.S. joint doctrine. These definitions closely parallel those approved by the United Nations and accepted by both militaries and international organizations.

The majority of the operations United States forces participate in are either United Nations or United Nations authorized peace operations, with the majority of those having humanitarian dimensions or consequences.² Since its inception, the UN has undertaken 54 peace operations, with 15 ongoing in April 2000.³

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

Peace operations are military supported operations that serve one or more of the five functions below. Of these, most are adaptations introduced in the 1990s. Prior UN peace operations consisted of traditional peacekeeping (defined below). In addition, humanitarian operations may require considerable military support and may be "stand-alone" or part of peace operations. The terms commonly used today to describe specific types of operations include:

Peace-making. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peace enforcement. Application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peace-building. Post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Preventive Diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.⁴

The need to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected populace is usually embedded within each of these types of operations. Providers of humanitarian assistance vary from operation to operation, based on situation, danger and need.

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.⁵

With common accepted terms for the language, I will now describe the participants.

THE PLAYERS

States use their militaries to further state interests, while Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) operate for humanitarian interests or profit motives. NGOs operate decentralized and are managed by consensus. Militaries, while operating centralized or decentralized, do so under authoritarian control. A comparison between these broad types of organizations was initially done when military and NGO leaders met at the National Defense University in 1996 and identified several areas where military and NGOs differ in their approaches: Setting initial objectives, defining endstate, making plans, and communications.⁶

This section identifies the key categories of players involved in peace and humanitarian operations. Since the target audience is primarily military, description of the military players concentrates mostly on deployment and planning considerations. The section on international organizations, on the other hand, describes their organization, funding, culture, and unique requirements.

MILITARY UNITS

On the surface, the sheer size of the military makes it easy to assume a few peace operations should be a "drop in the bucket" out of available resources. But diving under the surface rapidly reveals the magnitude of challenges arising from extended duration operations. Longer duration operations pose the greatest challenge, imposing substantial rotational requirements. For starters, three times the number of units on the ground are completely affected: the engaged unit, the unit preparing to deploy, and the unit recovering from deployment. Others are also affected; the unit responsible for training the unit on the ground, units providing personnel to fill vacant slots in deploying units, and units responsible for support preparations and recovery operations. Finally add into the equation the plethora of units involved in ongoing logistics, intelligence and support to lessons learned, and the picture of operational complexity and strain on key personnel and units comes into focus.⁷

Additionally, demands on a specific service, a branch within a service, specific type units, or military specialties can approach the magnitude of that of a major theater of war. A recent example is the impact on the U.S. Air Force during the bombing campaign within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia prior to U.S. ground operations in Kosovo. The campaign consumed nearly the same number of aircraft used during Desert Storm. The Department of Defense is currently attempting to manage a portion of the problem by implementing the Global Military Force Presence (GMFP) Policy. This policy requires services to identify Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) units whose rate of employment is threatening the long term health of the capability, and requires services to closely track and report annually on their status.⁸ As units

meet or exceed deployment thresholds, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will either deny further requests by commands for these units, or pull committed units to support operations with a higher priority. Any service members deployed in excess of the number of days established as the threshold, receive significant monetary reimbursement. There are nineteen types of units currently being tracked by this policy.

Low Density/High Demand Units tracked under Global Force Military Presence Policy as of March 2002	
E-3 AWACS	EC-130E ABCCC
U-2	EC-130H
Compass Call	E-8 JSTARS
RC-135 Rivet Joint	HC-130P
HH-60G	GTACS
EA-6B	Predator
Patriot	Technical Escort Units
MH-53J/M	(Chemical/Biological)
MC-130P	Chemical Company (BIDS)
MC-130E	TPN-19(Approach Control Radar)

While the GMFP policy seems sound in theory, in practice the policy is waived whenever high priority missions arise. The most recent example is the War on Terrorism. This war finds generally the same type units called upon once again. Since defeating terrorism is such a high national objective, no units were exempted from deployment. The DOD also waived all tracking of personnel and units deployed for the purposes of monetary incentives for the service members or reduced unit rotations.

All of these factors weigh heavily on unit readiness, retention and morale of both service members and their families. The DOD must look in all directions to find methods for achieving economies of scale. The military simply cannot sustain itself without long term adverse impacts while maintaining the current operations and personnel tempo.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International organizations or IOs is the term used to describe any institution that operates in more than one country.⁹ IOs can be either governmental, Inter-Governmental (IGO) or Non-Governmental (NGO).

Wherever the United States attempts to quell conflicts or mitigate humanitarian disaster, it works in concert with IOs. Whereas the ways the military operates and the means it uses differ from those of the IOs, everyone works towards the same ultimate outcome. While the military finds itself working with or alongside IOs in virtually all operations around the world, many soldiers and military leaders do not understand the people within IOs, or the methods their organizations use to accomplish their mission. Each year, these organizations gain more prominence in both ability and perceived stature, a trend that will continue for the foreseeable future.

Following World War I, the first recognized IGO that focused on security as well as other functional tasks and had nearly universal membership was the League of Nations.¹⁰ Since then, IGOs assumed an ever increasing role in responding to crises and orchestrating the efforts of other international actors, namely the military and NGOs. Today, IGOs like NATO and the UN, sponsor, approve or conduct virtually every peace operation in which the U.S. participates. The U.S. does however maintain the right to act independently on operations if the conduct is in our national interests.

Since both IGOs and NGOs usually sprout from other religious, ethnic, cultural or governmental organizations, there is significant overlap in their functions and purposes. In the UN alone, 14 organizations claim a role in a range of emergency and post conflict reconstruction activities; 14 more have capacities in emergency relief and protection of refugees; 10 focus on human rights; 14 on peace-building; 5 on analysis of post conflict recovery; 12 on demobilization of militaries; 9 on demining & mine awareness; and 4 on peacemaking.¹¹

An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.¹² They are dedicated to serving and protecting those not served by official institutions, while taking part in four varieties of activities:

- Humanitarian assistance
- Human rights

- Civil society and democracy building
- Conflict resolution¹³

The number, size, and budgets of NGOs has grown exponentially in the past 20 years. The 1998-99 yearbook of International Organizations lists 16,586 NGOs with 50% representing Western countries working in the developing world. This number doubled since 1978 and increased 20 fold since 1951. The primary reason for this rapid growth in numbers is purely needs based, with the number of NGOs rising as the number of refugees and displaced persons in the world has grown to 40-50 million people.¹⁴

Large numbers of NGOs participate in every operation. While sources vary considerably as to the number of NGOs involved, most agree that up to 1000 separate organizations participated during the height of the Bosnia operations and several hundred are currently on the ground in Kosovo.

NGOs clearly state their values, goals and purpose when they organize, with all recognized by their country of origin. They have flat structures and once organized, they tend to make decisions within their organizations by consensus rather than majority or plurality votes. While this is a foreign concept to military leaders, their rationale that substantial dissent among humanitarian organizations prevents effective action is sound.¹⁵

IOs receive funding in one of two ways, directly from sponsor countries or from private donations. IGOs primary funding comes from state sponsors while NGOs receive the majority of their money from private donations. Funding, of course, effects the mission, organization and decision making process of these organizations. While the amount of funding, and its effect on organizations is purely illustrative, it is always good to understand to whom the organization is accountable.

IGOs receive the majority of their funding from state budgets and therefore are dependent on member states for implementation of decisions. NGOs tend to receive funding on voluntary rather than obligatory basis, negating the need for consensus from above, but maintaining the need for consensus from within. However, some receive funds from and become implementing partners with states or IGOs. When this occurs, the NGO operates under constraints not normally familiar to them. For both types of organizations, public and media attention are key. Once a need receives international attention, states and private citizens get involved. The public attention usually prompts adequate resources and donations for these operations, while similar but less known tragedies go under-funded.¹⁶ Situations with the greatest media visibility attract NGOs because of the positive effect on the NGOs ability to raise funds.

All NGOs have a common purpose of making the world a better place. They have legitimate agendas but operate differently than the military. Most dedicate themselves to humanitarian relief, institution building or provision of services, as well as striving to maintain a policy of strict neutrality in conflict situations. As they try to relieve human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious or other affiliations, they remain under close scrutiny. Both their donors and groups in the humanitarian relief area that they are not assisting, constantly monitor them for inconsistent action. This monitoring creates more reason to distance themselves from the military, who have very strict political agendas.

While they desire complete freedom of action without reliance on the military, the situation on the ground normally requires some interaction. Each operation finds IOs with some reliance on the military, at least until the situation stabilizes. Examples of this reliance in the past has included strategic lift to the area of operations, ground transportation once there, convoy and area security, logistics and maintenance support, communications support, and contracting for services. As a way of eliminating one of these needs, a University of Toronto study recommended a specially trained private security force for protection of NGOs and their staffs.¹⁷

The growth of importance and numbers of NGOs over the past twenty years will continue as their role becomes embedded in the international mindset. Their very nature requires them to retain their independence from political or military influence, while maintaining focus on their humanitarian cause.

The disparity in both culture and motivation of the key players creates inherent difficulties in working together. Current and future operations will see increased reliance on civilian organizations. Military and civilian organizations must work as a team.

The next section identifies past challenges to this required teamwork.

PAST AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

The primacy of readiness for [Major Theater War] in current U.S. strategy, coupled with a robust peacetime engagement and overseas presence effort, are key components of the equation for which the U.S. has but one military force.¹⁸

Fighting and winning the Nation's wars is the most visible and best known mission for our military. However, what our military does in peace is just as critical to world order. Every day, thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines show our nation's resolve by demonstrating our values and capabilities in peace and humanitarian operations around the world.

Staying engaged militarily provides many long term benefits for our country. While the presence of our military doesn't eliminate the requirements for our other elements of national

power, such as diplomatic, economic or informational, it clearly shows our resolve in democratic, security and prosperity issues.

While the military can get the job done, it must be selective as to when and where to use it. By focusing on both threats and opportunities that are most closely aligned to national interests the U.S. can more carefully assess the size and duration of each mission, ensuring wise use of soldiers.

All military operations are a projection of our political will and our national interests. Knowing that our country can't do it all, our military and political leaders determine where and when to enforce our will through a hierarchical system of interests and values. Peace operations, as a sub-set of small scale contingencies, are analyzed against our three levels of interests, followed by three categories of SSCs.

Our three categories of national interests are Vital, Important, and Humanitarian. Vital interests are directly connected to the survival, safety or vitality of the nation. Important interests affect our national well being or that of the world in which we live. Humanitarian interests express our values and relate to both humanitarian and other longer-term interests such as reacting to natural and manmade disasters; acting to halt gross violations of human rights; supporting emerging democracies; encouraging adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; or conducting joint recovery operations worldwide to account for our country's war dead.¹⁹

Small scale contingencies also fall into three categories:

1. Operations linked to vital interests or highly compelling security imperatives (lives of U.S. citizens or maintaining stability in a key area).
2. Operations involving important interests such as contributing to coalition or alliance security objectives.
3. Operations not linked to vital or important interests. These operations often have humanitarian implications and potentially high media interest.²⁰

As stated earlier, SSCs are the most common type of operations, and are creating a significant drain on the U.S. military. The long duration of many of these operations magnifies that drain. Decisions to execute most category 2 and 3 missions are usually more political than military, and are the most likely categories for reducing costs and the operations tempo of our military. To help in the implementation decision, the military has established filters to shape their recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense. These filters weigh tempo and readiness impacts for use in the decision making process.

Another key element relating to over-commitment, is the size of the military relative to the past, and the increased number of operations. As the pace of operations quickened in recent years, available resources were substantially reduced resulting in increased difficulty in meeting a wide variety of operational and programmatic requirements. Three notable challenges are costs, increasing demands (doing more with less) and non-availability of assets.²¹

As stated earlier, while the military end strength decreased by 30%, the number of soldiers deployed on any given day rose 300% since the end of the Cold War. This demand is expected to remain high over the next 15-20 years.²² Since the Gulf War, U.S. service members deployed on more than 50 named major overseas SSC's (500 or more personnel committed).²³ The SSC's don't only affect those soldiers. Additional forces outside of the rotation, such as those that help train and deploy others also are vital. The practical lesson of force planning for long-duration commitments is that hedging three similar force (and personnel) elements for each unit actually deployed is insufficient. Generally four or five of an asset or unit is necessary to sustain each element committed for a long duration.²⁴ Additionally, the Army is designed to deploy and operate as divisions and corps. Tailored force packages, usually at the brigade level, deploy on these operations. These packages receive "slices" of all of the combat support and combat service support enablers, many of which are not designed to be "sliced" down to that level. When the next rotation comes there are insufficient "slices" to go around and the LD/HD equation comes back into play. The DOD is currently undergoing its largest transformation in recent history. The numerous transformation studies will bring change to our current structure, but only time will tell if the DOD will be able to fund and field sufficient enablers to fill the LD/HD gaps. The magnitude of the current strategy-resources mismatch and the damage it can cause over time if not addressed, demands that we increase the level of resources devoted to defense. We can increase resources by taking advantage of potential economies of scale to reduce costs while maintaining acceptable levels of risk, or change the defense strategy to reduce the demands being placed on the armed forces.²⁵

Some experts propose creating dedicated peacekeeping forces to minimize training and proficiency challenges that wartime postured units find. But most commanders feel their units would lose their fighting edge if they were purely focused on peace operations.²⁶ Additionally, creating military units not designed to fight our nations wars stands a strong possibility of creating defacto "second class military citizens" subordinate to the "warrior class."

An additional problem with troop levels is that contributing nations often determine the size of forces they will commit, not based on a mission analysis and the commander's recommendations, but on political considerations. Recent examples include Croatia in 1992

when the Vance plan recommended 40,000 soldiers and the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized 13,000, in Bosnia in 1993 when the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) recommended 60,000 and the UNSC authorized 8,000,²⁷ or a U.S. example concerning Kosovo in 1999 when the 1st Infantry Division recommended 30,000 soldiers for a forced entry operation into their sector and were told to execute the mission with 7,000.

Multinational operations add an additional problem. Many troop contributing nations often do not have specialty units (intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs or communications), logistics or power projection capabilities to support their own forces. In these instances, the U.S. must compensate, placing even greater pressure on our LD/HD assets.

The challenges clearly show that requirements exceed the capability of the military to sustain operations at the current rate without negative impacts on equipment, morale, combat readiness and stress on families. The next section identifies national and international policies concerning use of our forces in small scale contingencies.

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL

Several U.S government agencies and international organizations identified options to alleviate many challenges of declining forces and increasing missions. Whether the policies are new, old, or under revision, they all share a common theme of recommending ways for all involved to work together to increase efficiency and mission success. Selecting a combination of these options provides a realistic solution to the problem. Below is an outline of current directives and recommendations to reduce operations and personnel tempo, while increasing availability of forces.

National Security Strategy – 2000 (Currently under revision):

- Use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools. Act in alliance or partnership when others share our interests.²⁸
- Put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely with other U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and coalition partners.²⁹

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review - 2001 Study:

- Nominate, assess, and create or re-structure both active and reserve units and capabilities to facilitate SSC operations.³⁰
- Consider permanent stationing and longer tours of duty in lieu of temporary changes of stations, or repositioning forward deployed forces.³¹
- Take advantage of potential tradespace to reduce costs while maintaining acceptable levels of risk.³²

- Increase use of civilian contractors, non-DoD U.S. Government agencies and NGOs.³³
- Develop strategy to build up expeditionary capabilities on non-DoD agencies including gaining necessary support and funding from Congress³⁴

State Department Strategic Plan:

- Provide IOs with adequate early warning, information sharing, and emergency response capabilities.³⁵
- Strengthen partnerships with IOs and NGOs to build their capacities to address humanitarian crises³⁶

Brahimi Report: Additionally, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel charged with reviewing UN peace and security activities. The panel issued its report in August 2000. Several of the key points and recommendations were:

- Don't execute missions unless peacekeepers are able to defend themselves and the peace accord.
- Bedrock principles of peacekeeping remain consent of the parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense.
- Ensure resolutions are consistent with human rights standards and have practical specified tasks and timelines.
- Ensure resolutions delineate a clear chain of command and unity of effort.
- Plan for deployment of forces to a traditional peacekeeping operation in 30 days, 90 days for complex peace operations.
- Set minimum requirements for unit capabilities and training.
- UN must develop an analysis mechanism to distinguish where peacekeeping can succeed and where it will become an impossible mission.

The bottom line focus coming from policy makers can be summed up in a few points.

- Don't commit to operations without a clear mission, endstate, and expectation of success. Ensure the force is appropriately tailored for the mission.
- Use military coalitions to build world consensus and reduce committed U.S. forces.
- Form coalitions with both government agencies and NGOs to achieve desired endstate and decrease time necessary for complete military disengagement.

The next section provides guidance and a litmus test on what our national leaders should consider when choosing to use the military.

WHEN TO USE THE MILITARY

It is indisputable that since the end of the cold war there has been a dramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali³⁷

So what is the appropriate use of our military short of major war? How should we involve U.S. military in SSCs and peace operations? What guidelines should we use to make these decisions?

The administration determines both the number of operations and the ends they expect to achieve upon mission completion. In a broad sense, they also set the ways to achieve those objectives through policy and directives. Governmental departments must adjust their methods of planning and execution within the parameters of policy to reduce friction and increase capability to conduct operations. By more efficiently managing currently available means to conduct operations, while simultaneously finding innovative ways to increase the resource pool, the United States will better meet its objectives.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly identifies the need to carefully manage engagement activities to prevent erosion of current and long term military readiness for large scale contingencies.³⁸ Additionally, the NSS defines questions to consider prior to committing military force which include clearly defined mission and endstate.³⁹ Strictly adhering to these parameters would reduce the number and duration of SSC's.

We are more inclined to act where our interests and values are both at stake and where our resources will affect tangible improvement, as in Bosnia and Kosovo. In each of these instances, atrocities against and the expulsion of people in the heart of Europe undermined the very values over which we had fought two World Wars and the Cold War. Left unchecked, the problem could have spread elsewhere throughout Europe. The migrations of refugees could destabilize surrounding countries and harm the NATO alliance. NATO success in these operations was also considered vital for the future of the organization. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, we saw our interests affected to a sufficient degree to warrant military intervention.⁴⁰

The decision to employ military forces to support humanitarian interests focuses more on the military's unique capabilities and resources rather than on its combat power. Generally, combat forces quickly create a safe and secure environment and pave the way for the follow-on force and the rest of the military capabilities key to solving humanitarian concerns. These

capabilities are wide ranging, including: strategic lift of relief supplies, water purification, and in-country mobility.

The government normally decides to use the military only when the scale of a humanitarian catastrophe exceeds the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to provide an immediate response; the military is needed to establish the preconditions necessary for effective application of other instruments of national power; humanitarian crisis could affect U.S. combat operations; or when a response requires unique military resources. Such efforts by the U.S., preferably in conjunction with other members of the international community, are limited in duration, have a clearly defined mission and end state, entail minimal risk to U.S. lives, and are designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.⁴¹

But before we commit forces, we should first answer some basic questions outlined in our National Security Strategy:

1. Have we explored or exhausted non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of achieving our goals?
2. Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
3. What is the threat environment and what risks will our forces have?
4. What level of effort will be needed to achieve our goals?
5. What is the potential cost – human and financial – of the operation?
6. What is the opportunity cost in terms of maintaining our capability to respond to higher priority contingencies?
7. Do we have milestones and a desired endstate to guide a decision on terminating the mission?
8. Is there an interagency or multinational political-military plan to ensure that hard-won achievements are sustained and continued in the mission area after the withdrawal of U.S. forces?

Additionally, we should ask if there are other resources, national or international, capable of augmenting employment of military assets.

With the players, challenges, and guidance identified, the next section starts to pull the pieces together and shows how we can create unity of effort.

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT

So how do we facilitate the process of getting all parties working together towards a common goal? We can gain the most for our military by concentrating on better working

relationships with NGOs. First, by understanding who the NGOs are, how they operate, and what they bring to the fight. Second, by studying how the military has historically worked with NGOs, what worked well and what didn't. This section discusses areas where the military and the U.S. government can help NGOs to help us, then compares the contrasting cultures of the two organizations so both can gain a better understanding of the other.

Declining readiness levels and retention rates, coupled with numerous studies citing insufficient personnel to perform required tasks, clearly show a mismatch between ends, ways and means. Numerous options, identified by policy and strategy documents, could reduce this imbalance. The military can find ways to share the functions performed by LD/HD units. The NGOs are also stretched thin. As previously stated in "The Players," among other support requirements, NGOs can usually use more transportation getting both to and around within the Area of Operation, logistics and maintenance support, security, contracting, and funding. NGOs also benefit from the sharing of information and deconflicting areas of operation covered by other NGOs.

As discussed earlier, the military identified types of units and military specialties that are both low density and high demand (LD/HD).⁴² Increasing the number of these units would solve some of the problem. However, with the total number of personnel capped by Congress, every increase in LD/HD units would result in a decrease somewhere else. An increase might be the right answer following a top to bottom review ongoing as part of the DOD transformation. Better managing how and when these units deploy, defining their endstates, and identifying agencies to assume their missions, will significantly reduce current turbulence. The NSS and the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identify the need for the military to work closely with outside agencies. They recommend that the military hand off many tasks previously accomplished by soldiers, by working closely with other U.S. government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), regional and international security organizations, and coalition partners.⁴³⁴⁴

Currently many of the functions performed by the LD/HD assets are duplicated by coalition partners and NGOs. Passing responsibility for these functions either completely or earlier in operations will significantly reduce the operations and personnel tempo experienced by these soldiers and units.

Once again, a study of NGOs habitually conducting operations in a commander's Area of Responsibility can quickly determine likely organizations involved in future operations.

Strategic airlift is a significant cost for NGOs on tight budgets. The DoD has methods to provide airlift, and has supplied it during several past operations. A prime example is Operation Support Hope, discussed in the next section.

The official U.S. government position on providing military strategic lift to non DoD organizations is: "U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration, use DoD airlift for activities such as noncombatant evacuation operations, counterdrug operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, and domestic support operations. **Non-DoD agencies may use common-user airlift, providing the DOD mission is not impaired.** (emphasis included in original text) The movement must be of an emergency, lifesaving nature, specifically authorized by statute, in direct support of DOD mission, or requested by the Head of an Agency of the Government under title 31 USC 1535 and 1536. To obtain common-user airlift, non-DOD agencies submit requests in accordance with DOD Directive 4500.9, *Transportation and Traffic Management*."⁴⁵

The procedures are clearly in place to provide strategic lift for these organizations. The precedent for providing this service is also set. The military must use this knowledge and precedent to its advantage.

NGOs do not have a tax base to obtain funds like governments do. They rely on contributions for continued operations. Most NGOs treasure their independence and do not want to be perceived as a government puppet. However, some do accept governmental contributions. Acceptance doesn't necessarily mean an NGO will do what a government asks, but it does generally mean the objectives of the government and the NGO are parallel in the work performed.

The U.S. Government (USG) provides substantial compensation to many Non-Governmental Organizations working on humanitarian relief efforts around the world. Of the 439 U.S. NGOs registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 244 receive USG funds totaling more than \$2 Billion annually.⁴⁶

USAID Freight	\$ 10,604,407
PL 480 Freight	\$125,937,200
PL 480 Donated Food	\$232,125,477
USAID Grants	\$911,199,778
USAID Contracts	\$220,946,390
USG Grants	\$620,283,171
<u>USG Contracts</u>	<u>\$ 66,683,343</u>
Total	\$2,187,779,766

Understanding which NGOs receive money from the U.S. government and which ones habitually operate in the AOR gives an indication of which NGOs could share some of the military burden.

Another area to understand is the cultural difference in the military and NGOs. The military and IOs have contrasting cultures which create barriers that must be breached early on. However, with knowledge of each others strengths and weaknesses and operational practices, these two groups can learn to complement each other. A comparison of the cultural norms, both real and perceived, highlight the starting point for this working relationship.⁴⁷

Recognizing the need to establish common support mechanisms InterAction, a membership body for major American relief and development NGOs, sponsored a membership conference. The conferees determined in an age of declining aid and increasing humanitarian operations, they must coordinate better or get left behind. They understood that the NGOs that coordinated best with the U.S. government would receive the most money and the best logistical support.⁴⁸

Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to many crises, NGOs can lessen the military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Whenever possible, we must seek to operate alongside these organizations, while

CULTURAL COMPARISONS	
Military	IGOs/NGOs
Closely Controlled	Independent Or Semi-Independent
Hierarchical	Decentralized
Well resourced	Minimally Staffed
Extensive Doctrine/SOP's	Few Standard Practices
Short Term	Long Haul
Culturally Insensitive	Culturally Aware
Precise, Predictable	Creative, Unpredictable
Highly Accountable	Little Accountability
Expeditionary, Quick	May already be in the AO, or Slow
One Constituency	Multiple Constituencies
Comfortable with status Quo	Idealistic Change Agents
Appreciate Precise Tasks	Thrive on Ambiguity
Carries the flag	IGOs usually have official status NGOs usually don't

integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths.⁴⁹

There are about fifty key NGOs we repeatedly see on Peace Operations. Some, at considerable sacrifice, contribute personnel to advise or role-play in major military exercises and participate in key military sponsored conferences. Educating ourselves, while working together before deployments, improves our ability to work well together in the mission area.

Analyzing which NGOs habitually work in a unit's area of responsibility (AOR), and which ones accept government funding provides a good indicator of which organizations will be there in the future. Organizations that meet both pre-requisites are prime candidates for future successful coalitions.

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESS

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT – IRAQ – 1991

The Iraqi army quickly defeated the Kurds, who rose up against Saddam Hussein at the encouragement of American radio broadcasts. Within weeks, over one million Kurds had displaced to high mountain passes to avoid annihilation. Five hundred to one thousand of these Kurds were dying every day when President Bush ordered military intervention on April 6th.⁵⁰

A military coalition consisting of three sub-Task Forces, along with many NGOs, deployed to Northern Iraq and created “safe havens” from control of the Government of Iraq for the Kurds. The military and NGOs provided humanitarian aid and rebuilt villages destroyed earlier in the war, in preparation for resettling the Kurds. Within three months, the death rate due to the harsh conditions declined to near zero in mountain areas of concentration, all Kurds returned to their homes, and major military units began redeployment. The United States maintained a small military presence in Northern Iraq until December 1996. They were used in conjunction with what is now Operation Northern Watch to protect Kurds from the Government of Iraq.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE – SOMALIA 1992-1993

Somalia experienced a nation-wide man-made famine complicated by bloody inter-clan battles. Clans and profit seekers confiscated critical donated food supplies immediately after they arrived in country, using this food as a source of power and corruption. NGOs considered 50% food losses acceptable, as they hired mercenaries for protection. When U.S. military forces entered the country under UN mandate, 4 million people lived in famine areas with 330,000 facing imminent death.⁵¹

The U.S. military forces provided security, opened supply lines, and assisted NGOs in getting relief supplies to where they were needed. These efforts saved over 110,000 lives. While the U.S. Task Force was successful, the transition to UN Forces in Somalia (UNISOM II) was not. UNISOM II had command and control and security difficulties leading to continued problems in and around Mogadishu. U.S. forces withdrew as U.N. forces assumed control of the operations. Unfortunately, the relief efforts began to fail, forcing the U.S. to send forces back to Somalia.

OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE – RWANDA – 1994

The massacre of over 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda between April and June 1994 created a refugee crisis causing the U.S. to provide soldiers to assist the UN relief effort. Only 3,600 soldiers provided logistics support and a security umbrella for a large number of NGOs. When

the military arrived, there were over 800,000 refugees in Goma, Zaire and 1,100 were dying every day.⁵²

Within 60 days, NGO water purification facilities replaced U.S. military water purification units and food and medical supplies reached refugee camps. The U.S. military established various metrics as measures of success. As they continued to improve living conditions in the refugee camps, they saw death rates return to normal levels for the population. Thirty days later, U.S. soldiers redeployed.

These operations are just a sampling in a growing list of successful cooperative efforts between the military and NGOs. Reading the after action reviews by both civilian and military organizations reveals one common belief in the reason for success, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). For military members, the name CMOC implies a coordinated operations effort with one person in charge. For members of the NGOs, CMOC is more of a discussion area where they can exchange ideas, rather than a coordination area. For all concerned, the CMOC means communications. It is the conduit for the exchange of ideas and the single string that ties the humanitarian effort together.

The next section provides recommendations for the military to adjust or focus current procedures to increase mission capabilities and success while reducing committed forces.

THE ROAD AHEAD

No amount of peacekeeping and peacebuilding capabilities will make up for the absence of an overall strategy and the underlying consensus on the objectives and the proper ways with which to deal with the challenges. If not embedded in a broader strategy of nationbuilding, military peacekeeping will fail either in theater as a military operation or as part of the broader strategy when the conflict resumes as soon as the peacekeepers have been withdrawn.

—Robert Dorff⁵³

Reducing the number of missions or the duration of missions are two actions the administration could take to alleviate the force structure mismatch, but neither is likely to occur. This section discusses recommendations to change the long-term methodology in which we approach peace operations, then outlines five key elements of success for tackling specific missions.

The previously identified guidance and recommendations offered by several government agencies clearly identify a recognized need to change our current methods of operations. These recommendations support the premise that the military cannot and should not try to

accomplish everything on their own. Two recommendations to reduce the military workload are to increase available resources and adjust procedures used to accomplish their missions.

We can multiply available resources by forming better coalitions with IOs, military partners, and the host government to perform non-military tasks currently performed by our military units. We can stop duplication of effort by analyzing missions and goals of these organizations and determining where those goals can assist the national objective. By assisting these organizations, where practicable, in moving to and establishing operations within the area, we complete both military and IO missions more efficiently. Some organizations will opt to remain completely independent, while others will realize that accepting logistics support will speed their timeliness of supporting needy people, decrease time needed to conduct operations, and increase the amount of funding available to accomplish their goals.

Adjusting procedures simply means re-looking methods of both unit replacement and rotation before turning to any force re-structuring plans. We must break from the mindset that all units entering an area of operations must be replaced. Some organizations like civil affairs, construction, and water purification can move in, accomplish specific tasks, and then draw down either completely or to a level of managing established programs. Additionally, adjusting or extending unit rotations will create significantly less turmoil by reducing the number of personnel affected and easing workload on transition centers.

Success in planning for future and current missions boils down to five key elements. First, military headquarters and NGOs must initiate and maintain

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| <p style="text-align: center;">Elements for success</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Coordinate early and continuously with NGOs2. Designate Civilian Control of Humanitarian Operations3. Assign the CMOC as the main effort4. Understand the Humanitarian Perspective5. Appoint a Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD) |
|---|

continuous coordination. While it is too difficult for a military headquarters to maintain open links with every NGO, they can start the process by coordinating with USAID and InterAction. These organizations work with the majority of the key NGOs based out of the U.S. and can leverage critical support needed in most operations. Including these organizations during preparations of operations and contingency plans, execution of training exercises, and conduct of operations, greatly simplifies coordination once the government decides to begin new operations. We must also invite them to participate in After Action Reviews (AAR). While this concept doesn't appear to follow the NGO mindset discussed earlier, they do understand the role of the military and the benefits of security, monetary, and logistical support that comes with government cooperation. While inviting NGOs to all planning phases is necessary, the NGOs

will not always participate due to personnel and monetary constraints inherent with their organizations.

Second, the international body directing the mission (usually the UN) must continue to designate civilian control for humanitarian operations, called the Head of Mission (HOM) in most contemporary operations. Civilian control is the premise on which most large contributing nations base their military, therefore the military is accustomed to operating under this environment. This is the basic concept used for many current operations, however, the HOM often lacks the power and authority to back up his or her edicts—this must be rectified. Additionally, these operations normally continue long after the military goes home. Civilian control allows for continuity of command and eases coalition building with NGOs.

Third, for success in humanitarian operations, the military must change its cultural mindset that the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is the primary focus. In these operations, the CMOC is the main effort and the TOC, while critical to the security of all involved, is the supporting effort. In most future operations, the UN will establish a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) to serve as the lead agent for information exchange, coordination and deconfliction between the UN operations, military forces and IOs. In this case, the CMOC would become a component of the HOC. Assignment of some of the best and brightest to the CMOC or HOC must accompany this changing mindset. While this concept is easy to propose, it is difficult to find all of the right people given the personnel constraints previously discussed.

Fourth, the military must understand the humanitarian perspective. There are several aspects to this understanding. Part of this includes a basic awareness of local culture which the military has become quite proficient in over the past few years. But also included is the understanding of both the nations involved and the NGOs with their needs and objectives. The CMOC is an excellent conduit for exchange of cultural norms and concerns between all affected parties.

Finally, the military commander must appoint a respected member of the relief community to serve as his Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD). The HUMAD operates in much the same way as the Political Advisor (POLAD), serving as a respected expert in the field and advising the commander on critical aspects of the humanitarian mission. This advisor would also recommend which key IOs the military should assign liaisons with, and which events where the military and IOs should stand together in solidarity. The HUMAD would also be able to advise the commander when and when not to praise the IO efforts in public and media forums, thus giving them more legitimacy and support both at home and abroad.

There are no easy solutions to our military force structure mismatch. There are however, practical methods available to our leaders to accomplish current missions while easing the workload for several severely overtaxed units. Building coalitions with organizations wishing to remain independent, deploying units for longer periods of time, and understanding the operation from the NGO perspective are difficult in the short term. However, the long term gains from these actions will benefit our soldiers, our nation, and those nations we are trying to protect.

CONCLUSION

The only reason Operation Provide Comfort worked so well was because it was all done without a piece of paper being signed; the situation grew up so quickly that it outstripped the government's ability to be bureaucratic.

—Major General James Jones

The complexity of peace operations is long recognized within both the U.S. government and the military. The White House and the Departments of State and Defense published directives, strategic plans and doctrine defining how to conduct these operations. However, the high levels of force commitment in these operations and other small scale contingencies, continues to erode the combat capabilities of the forces we rely on to defend our nation in war.⁵⁴

To reduce friction produced through conduct of robust levels of SSCs while striving to maintain high levels of readiness for war, we must either reduce the number or duration of operations, or find innovative ways to increase the availability of forces.⁵⁵ The administration and military, working in concert and following published guidance, can reduce the friction and increase readiness.

The sons and daughters of the United States of America receive praise and respect wherever they deploy to alleviate world problems. They are always up to the task and never have, and never will, let our country down. We owe it to these great Americans to train and build our organizations for peace operations, using the most efficient methods available. Only then, can our country's leaders say we are doing as much for our service members as they are doing for America.

WORD COUNT = 8091

ENDNOTES

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